THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON THE ABILITY IN PREVENTING FINANCIAL DISTRESS: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA CONSUMER GOODS by Hatane, Saarce Elsye et al.
1 
 
THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON THE ABILITY IN 
PREVENTING FINANCIAL DISTRESS: EVIDENCE FROM 
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA CONSUMER GOODS 
 
Saarce Elsye Hatane, Nathalia Chandra and Josua Tarigan 
International Business Accounting Petra Christian University 
Corresponding Email: elsyehat@petra.ac.id 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the ability in preventing 
financial distress in the context of Indonesia and Malaysia consumer goods companies. Corporate 
governance components used are board-structures, managerial ownership, and gender diversity. Board 
structures consist of board size and board independence composition. The corporate governance components 
are hand-made collection from reading the annual report of each company and collecting the information 
needed. The ability in preventing in financial distress is measured by the modified concept of business failure 
by Pindado, Rodriguesb, & De La Torre (2008). It is measured by profitability (EBIT), financial expense 
(FE) and retained earnings (RE). This research study examines the consumer goods companies in Indonesia 
and Malaysia for the period of 2011 to 2015 with the total sample of 24 Indonesia companies or 120 firm-
years observations and 98 Malaysia companies or 490 firm-years observations. The findings of this research 
study present mixed results. Board structure has a significant impact on the ability in preventing financial 
distress in Indonesia whereas it was found no significant impact in case of Malaysia companies. On contrary, 
there is no significant impact on managerial ownership in Indonesia; while Malaysia’s result shows there is 
a significant impact. Additionally, this study found that there is a significant impact on gender diversity to 
the ability in preventing financial distress in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Gender diversity also serves as 
moderating variable in both countries even though the type of moderation between both countries are 
different.  
Keywords: Board Size, Board Independence Composition, Gender Diversity, Managerial Ownership, 
Financial Distress, Consumer Goods Sector, Indonesia, Malaysia  
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic and monetary crisis in 1997 – 
1998 has increased the interest and attention on 
corporate governance in Asia. As it is shown on 
Table 1, percentage of Indonesia and Malaysia 
distressed companies are the highest with 49.62% 
and 47.21% respectively compared to Korea, 
Philippines, Thailand. Distressed companies in the 
research of Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper (2003) 
are identified as companies which had an interest 
coverage (the ratio of interest expenses to earnings) 
less than one in 1998 (Claessens, et al., 2003). 
Although Indonesia and Malaysia had the highest 
percentage of distressed companies, but both 
countries had the first and third lowest percentage of 
number of bankruptcy companies with 3.03% 
(Indonesia) and 7.09% (Malaysia). Despite that, 
growth of real GDP of Indonesia in 1998 were 
declining 13.7% due to financial crisis (Claessens, et 
al., 2003). 
 
Source: (Claessens, et al., 2003). 
Table 1. Summary Statistics on Bankruptcy Fillings 
in 1997 and 1998  
Years later, financial crisis in 2008 and 
financial scandals in Enron, World COM, Lehman 
Brothers, AIG and others have given attention to 
many parties including academics, researchers, 
regulators, policymakers and investors to evaluate 
corporate governance and its impact on performance 
and financial distress (Shahwan, 2015) 
Generally, corporate governance is described 
as the system in which companies are directed and 
controlled (International Finance Corporation 
Advisory Sevices in Indonesia, 2014). Corporate 
governance is important as it is not only 
strengthening the business’s capability in attracting 
investment and growing, but also developing 
companies to be more efficient and accountable. 
Corporate governance also contributes to economic 
and financial crisis promotion and prevention, 
scandal as well as transparency and accountability 
(Rajablu, 2016; Campbell & Minquez-Vera, 2008). 
In term of agency theory, corporate governance can 
be used to mitigate the agency problems which occur 
in the company. Corporate governance can also 
minimize the tendency of managers to prioritize 
their own interests, thus the interest of both 
managers and shareholders can be aligned. 
For this research study, financial distress is 
defined as the lack of company’s ability to cover its 
maturity financial obligations. There have been 
many research studies that have conducted the 
impact of corporate governance to probability of 
financial distress, however the findings are varied 
due to different indicators, sample, period, economic 
condition and others. Manzaneque, Priego, & 
Merino, (2016), Akhmetova & Batomunkueva 
(2014), Donker, Santen, & Zahir (2009), Kristanti, 
Rahayu and Huda (2016), Bredart (2014) are some 
of the researchers who have done the research in this 
topic. However, all of them are conducted in one 
specific country. Hence this study is conducted in 
two countries, namely Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Moreover, it would be interesting to learn whether 
the models developed for US companies also apply 
to foreign companies (Pindado, et al., 2008). 
Furthermore in fact, there is an increasing interest in 
conducting research using data from several 
countries at the same time (Pindado, et al., 2008) 
This research study chooses Indonesia and 
Malaysia listed companies in consumer goods sector 
as the sample due to some reasons. First, there is 
high competitiveness between companies in 
manufacturing industry particularly in consumer 
goods sector. Not only that, development of this 
industry and sector is very rapid. Manufacturing 
industry contributes 20.51% as the largest 
contributor to economy in Indonesia (Badan Pusat 
Statistik, 2017) whereas manufacturing industry in 
Malaysia is the second largest with 23% 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2017) 
Furthermore, the projection of Asian retails sales in 
2018 which is conducted by PWC (2015) indicates 
that there will be 60% of global consumer 
expenditure in food, beverage and tobacco category 
due to increase in income and shift in consumer 
preferences. Market demand growth in Indonesia 
and Malaysia for food, beverages and tobacco is 
predicted to be 5% and 5.1% respectively in 2018 
(PWC, 2015) compared to 3.5% and 4.5% 
respectively in 2011. 
Besides that, a study by McGee (2008) about 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in Asia 
which emphasizes on objectivity, compliance, 
fairness and other points shows that Malaysia 
reached 77.3 point out of 100, which is the total 
point, compared to Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam 
(McGee, 2008). It shows that Malaysia has better 
corporate governance compared to the other 
countries. Third, Indonesia and Malaysia are similar 
in terms of national culture which is measured by 
Hofstede cultural dimension. Both Indonesia and 
Malaysia have high power distance, low uncertainty 
avoidance, low individualism and low preference for 
avoiding uncertainty. For the masculinity, Indonesia 
is considered low whereas Malaysia’s score is 50 
which the preference of this dimension can’t be 
determined. 
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Source: (Hofstede, 2017) 
Figure 1. Comparison of Hofstede Score in 
Indonesia and Malaysia 
Hence based on above description, this 
research study will examine the issue with the 
following title: “The Impact of Board Structure, 
Managerial Ownership and Gender Diversity to the 
Ability in Preventing Financial Distress: Evidence 
from Indonesia and Malaysia Consumer Goods”. 
There will be remaining four sections in this 
research study. The second section explains 
literature review of the variables together with the 
theories and hypothesis. The third section describes 
the research methodology. The fourth section is 
about the result of the research, analysis, and 
discussion. The last section provides the summary of 
the research findings as well as suggestions for 
future research. 
Corporate Governance 
OECD (2004) describes corporate 
governance is a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Additionally, World Bank 
(2010) stated that corporate governance refers to 
“the structure and processes for the direction and 
control of companies.” Corporate governance has a 
key role in business success or failure and 
company’s accountability and transparency 
(Rajablu, 2016). Good corporate governance 
contributes to sustainable economic development by 
increasing the company’s performance (World 
Bank, 2010). In addition, corporate governance can 
help to reduce agency problems. The conflict of 
interest between management, shareholders, 
investors and debt holders are more serious and 
intense in financial distress situation compared to 
normal condition (Donker, et al., 2009). 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
Financial crisis in 1997-1998 that has 
brought a dramatic, adverse impact on Indonesia’s 
social, economic and political environment 
(International Finance Corporation Advisory 
Sevices in Indonesia, 2014). National Committee on 
Corporate Governance (KNKCG) has been 
established in 1999 and was then changed to 
National Committee on Governance (KNKG) in 
2004 (International Finance Corporation Advisory 
Sevices in Indonesia, 2014). Indonesia implements 
two – tier system in which the board of directors 
(BOD) and board of commissioners (BOC) are 
separated. BOC has the responsibility in overseeing 
and providing advice to BOD whereas BOD is 
responsible for the day-to-day of the company’s 
management (International Finance Corporation 
Advisory Services in Indonesia, 2014). 
Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
Malaysia was strong in governance 
guidelines compared to other Asian countries and 
had made some efforts to ensure effective corporate 
governance practices in its public listed companies 
even before the financial crisis in 1997-1998 
(Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Wahab, et al., 2015). 
Additionally, the emphasis on corporate governance 
practices were particularly being highlighted by 
Malaysia government in the aftermath of financial 
crisis in order to boost investors’ confidence. 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
is a key document in Malaysia’s corporate 
governance framework and has contributed 
significantly in increasing the corporate governance 
standards of Malaysian listed companies (Securities 
Commission Malaysia, 2016). MCCG was first 
issued in March 2000 and later was revised in 2007 
and 2012 (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012).. 
Malaysia adopts one – tier system or unitary board 
system in their corporate governance system which 
the responsibility of board of directors are about 
management oversight roles and performance 
evaluation roles (Kamardin & Haron, 2011). 
This research study would like to examine 
the impact of board structure, managerial ownership 
and gender diversity to the ability in preventing 
financial distress as a dependent variable with 
gender diversity is also as moderating variable. 
Ability in Preventing Financial Distress 
Financial distress begins when the company 
cannot meet its scheduled payments or when cash 
flow projection indicates that the company will soon 
be unable to cover its obligations (Brigham & 
Daves, 2007). Financial distress is also defined as 
the lack of company’s ability to cover its maturity 
financial obligations (Pindado, et al., 2008). A Dun 
& Bradstreet study examined the factors that cause 
a business failure. The study reports the factors are 
mainly financial factors (47.3%), economic factors 
(37.1%), neglect, disaster and fraud (14%) and other 
factors (1.6%) (Brigham & Daves, 2007). According 
to Pindado, Rodriguesb, & De La Torre (2008), 
financial distress companies that are considered are 
those that meet some of the following criteria: 
1. Its earnings before interest and taxes 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are 
lower than its financial expenses for two 
consecutive years; and/or 
2. A fall in its market value appears between 2 
(two) consecutive periods. 
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As this research study applies the concept of 
business failure by Pindado, Rodriguesb, & De La 
Torre (2008), the explanatory variables for financial 
distress will be earning before interest (EBIT), 
financial expense (FE) and retained earnings (RE). 
The selection of explanatory variables is relied on 
financial theory (Pindado, et al., 2008). The original 
formula of FE FEt/RTAt−1 is reversed for the purpose 
of this study. Profitability, financial expense and 
retained earnings will be calculated using 
EBITt/RTAt−1, RTAt−1/FEt, REt/RTAt−1 as the 
instrument of measure respectively. EBITt/RTAt−1, 
is measured by earnings before interest and taxes id 
divided by total assets at the beginning period. 
RTAt−1/FEt is measured by total assets at the 
beginning period divided by financial expense. 
Lastly, REt/RTAt−1 is measured by retained earnings 
divided by total assets at the beginning period. 
Board Structure 
Board Size. In agency framework, board has 
functions to resolve agency problems between 
managers and shareholders by setting compensation 
and replacing managers that do not create value for 
shareholders shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Small board size may be better in non – financial 
distressed companies due to free-rider problems and 
easier coordination (Yermack, 1996). Based on 
agency theory, large board size also increases the 
disciplinary control over the CEO and management. 
Large board size may have more business contacts 
that can raise the help in facing the financial distress 
situation through strategic alliances or partners to 
emerge from financial distress (Fich & Slezak, 
2008). As for resource dependence perspective, 
large board size means the more connections or 
external contacts and diversification of skills which 
can protect the company from the adversity in 
financial distress situation. Board size is measured 
by “the total numbers of members in the boards” 
(Manzaneque, et al., 2016; Akhmetova & 
Batomunkueva, 2014). 
Board Composition. Independent directors 
represents better shareholder’s interest compared to 
inside directors or non – independent directors in the 
distress situation (Fich & Slezak, 2008). Further, 
independent boards may be more willing to remove 
ineffective executives before a crisis reaching the 
point of corporate bankruptcy (Daily, et al., 2003). 
Independent director may also have more different 
skills and knowledge to give them perspective to 
solve the crisis (Fich & Slezak, 2008). It is in line 
with resource dependency theory which states that 
independent directors can bring in knowledge and 
expertise, thus it minimizes the uncertainty of the 
environment. Board composition is measured by 
“the number of independent board members divided 
by the total number of board members” 
(Manzaneque, et al., 2016; Akhmetova & 
Batomunkueva, 2014). Based on above description, 
the first hypothesis can be expressed as follow. 
H1: Board structure has an impact to the ability in 
preventing financial distress 
Managerial Ownership 
The monitoring and control function of the 
board can be improved through large managerial 
ownerhsip (Akhmetova & Batomunkueva, 2014; 
Salloum, et al., 2013), thus it also can reduce agency 
cost. Fich and Slezak (2008) conclude that large 
board ownership can minimize the bankruptcy 
hazard. Incentive mechanism including board 
ownership can be an effective incentive to align the 
interest of managers and shareholders (Donker, et 
al., 2009). Based on agency theory, board directors 
who have ownerhsip in the company will not make 
decisions that might potentially affect his wealth 
(Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fich and 
Slezak (2008) study shows there is negative 
relationship between share ownership of the board 
with the likelihood of business failure. Li, Wang and 
Deng (2008), Wang and Deng (2006), Donker, 
Santen, & Zahir (2009) and Manzaneque, Priego, & 
Merino (2016) concludes that there is a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and 
financial distress. Managerial ownership is 
measured by “the ratio of shares owned by the board 
to total outstanding ordinary shares” (Manzaneque, 
et al., 2016; Akhmetova & Batomunkueva, 2014). 
H2: Managerial ownership has an impact to the 
ability in preventing financial distress. 
Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity which comprises of men 
and women in board is a superior and tougher 
monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2004). Women can 
add value by giving different perspectives, 
experiences and opinions on the boardrooms 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2004). In addition, gender 
diversity has positive effect on company’s 
performance who have weak governance as measure 
by their abilities to resist takeovers (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). Aside from all of those, Kristanti, 
Rahayu and Huda (2016) proves that there is 
negative relationship between gender diversity with 
the financial distress. In contrary, research study of 
Santen and Donker (2009) shows that gender 
diversity and financial distress have no relationship. 
Gender diversity is measured by “number of women 
on board divided by total members on board” 
(Kristanti, et al., 2016; Carter, et al., 2003; Darmadi, 
2013). Based on above description, the third and 
fourth hypothesis can be expressed as. 
H3: Gender diversity has an impact to the ability in 
preventing financial distress. 
H4: Gender diversity has an impact as a moderating 
variable to the ability in preventing financial 
distress. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research will conduct the analysis on the 
independent variable, dependent variable and 
moderating variable as shown below. 
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a. Board structure, managerial ownership and 
gender diversity as independent variables. 
b. Gender diversity also as moderating variable. 
c. Ability in preventing financial distress as 
dependent variable. 
This research study uses secondary data 
which are taken from annual reports and Bloomberg. 
The population are consumer goods listed 
companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and 
Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2011 to 2015. This 
research study uses purposive sampling technique, 
thus there are four chosen criteria to determine the 
sample of the research which are as follows. 
1. For Indonesia companies, the company is listed 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in consumer 
goods sector. 
2. For Malaysia companies, the company is listed 
in Bursa Malaysia in consumer products sector.  
3. All Indonesia and Malaysia listed companies had 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) before 2010.  
4. All Indonesia and Malaysia listed companies 
published a complete annual report for the period 
of 2011 – 2015.  
5. All Indonesia and Malaysia listed companies had 
financial expense for the period of 2011 – 2015.  
RESEARCH RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
Using WarpPLS software, model analysis 
used in testing the hypotheses is shown below 
 
Figure 2. Model Analysis 
Based on the model analysis, the formula is 
expressed as below: 
PFD = α + β 1BS + β 2MO + β 3GD + β 4 GD x BS 
where: BSIZE = Board size; BCOMP = Board 
composition 
MOWN = Managerial ownership; BGENDER = 
Gender diversity; EBIT = Earnings before interest 
and taxes – Profitability; FE = Financial expense; RE 
= Retained earnings 
For Indonesia, the calculation for each independent 
variable is separated between the BOD and BOC 
(i.e. BSIZE is separated into BODSIZE and 
BOCSIZE). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 2. Descriptive Analysis of Indicators – 
Indonesia 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 3. Descriptive Analysis of Indicators –  
Malaysia 
As it shows in Table 2, all Indonesia 
consumer goods companies had complied with the 
regulation of UU PT. No. 40 year 2007 article 92 
paragraph (4) that states “…listed company must 
have at least 2 (two) members of board of directors”. 
This statement is also the same with statement on 
chapter 2 article 2 paragraph (1) of Indonesia 
Financial Services Authority (Number: 
33/POJK.04/2014) about Board of Directors and 
Board of Commissioners in Public Companies. In 
addition, BOCSIZE of Indonesia consumer goods 
companies had also complied with Under UU PT. 
No. 40 year 2007, article 108 paragraph (3) that 
states board of commissioners should consist of at 
least 1 (one) members or more in board of 
commissioners. On the other hand, Malaysia 
corporate governance code (MCCG) does not 
mentioned the exact number of board members nor 
set the maximum number of board directors in the 
company’s boards for listed companies (Securities 
Commission Malaysia, 2012). However, the number 
of member(s) on company’s board should be 
appropriate for company’s benefit and its business 
(Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012).  
At the same time in Malaysia, the range of 
BODCOMP is from 28.6% to 80% with the mean 
value of 45% which are slightly higher than 
Indonesia. The range of BODCOMP Malaysia is 
also higher than range of BODCOMP in Indonesia 
which are from 0% to 40%. The maximum 
BODCOMP in Malaysia is two times higher 
compared to Indonesia BODCOMP. On contrary, 
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the maximum BODCOMP in Malaysia is the same 
with maximum value of BOCCOMP in Indonesia. 
The range of BODMOWN are 0% to 23% 
(BOD - Indonesia), 0% to 2% and 0% (BOC - 
Indonesia) to 63.71% (Malaysia). The minimum 
BODMOWN in Malaysia has the same value with 
the minimum BODMOWN and BOCMOWN in 
Indonesia which are 0%. It indicates that many 
board of directors in Malaysia and Indonesia 
companies did not hold any share ownership. 
Maximum of BODMOWN in Malaysia is higher 
compared to BODMOWN and BOCMOWN in 
Indonesia. The mean of BODMOWN in Malaysia 
(15.9%) are higher compared to average 
BODMOWN in Indonesia (2%). 
For board of director gender diversity 
(BODGENDER), the range is from 0% to 67% with 
mean and standard deviation of 12% and 17% 
respectively. Board of commissioners’ gender 
diversity has the same minimum value of 0% and 
maximum value of 67% as BODGENDER. 
BOCGENDER mean is 14% and standard deviation 
is 21%. The maximum and mean of gender diversity 
in BOC is a little bit higher than in BOD. It shows 
that proportion of women on board is slightly higher 
on BOC compared to on BOD. In Malaysia, 
BODGENDER has minimum value of 0% and 
maximum value of 50% with mean of 11.12%. 
When average of BODGENDER in Malaysia is 
compared with BODGENDER in Indonesia, it 
shows that proportion of women on board of 
directors in Malaysia is slightly lower. 
Lastly, the average value of EBIT in 
Indonesia (0.17) is higher compared to Malaysia 
(0.08). On the contrary, Malaysia has higher average 
FE value of 3766.5167 compared to Indonesia which 
has average FE value of 565.67. On the other hand, 
the average values of RE in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia are quite similar with value of 0.26 and 
0.25 respectively. 
Goodness of Fit-Test 
Both Indonesia and Malaysia data show that 
the models have passed all criteria of goodness of fit 
test. This indicates that both models can be used in 
this research study as both models are considered to 
be fit. Table 4. presents the result of model fit and 
quality indices of Indonesia and Malaysia consumer 
goods listed companies. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 4. Model Fit and Quality Indices – Indonesia 
and Malaysia 
 
Profile of Variable 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 5. Weight Indicators – Indonesia 
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Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 6. Weight Indicators – Malaysia 
For Indonesia, all indicators of board 
structure show positive contribution, except 
BODCOMP. Weight indicator of BODCOMP 
shows negative contribution to the variable of board 
structure which means the higher number of 
independent board of directors on board, the lower 
board structure (BS) value it has. On contrary, the 
strongest indicator of board structure variable in 
Indonesia is BODSIZE with weight of 0.475. The 
positive sign means that the larger number of board 
of directors who sit on the board, the higher overall 
board structure value it has. It is in accordance with 
resource dependency theory. Resource dependency 
theory explained that larger board size gives many 
advantages, such as there will be different 
knowledge, expertise, experiences and contacts that 
the company can benefit from in achieving the 
business objectives through company’s capability in 
getting resources and information from directors 
(Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Fich 
& Slezak, 2008). On the other hand, for Malaysia 
case, board of director size (BODSIZE) and board 
of director composition (BODCOMP) have the 
same weight contribution to board structure variable 
with value of 0.900. Therefore, it means that board 
size is as important as board composition regarding 
their contribution to board structure variable in 
Malaysia. However, board of director composition 
in Malaysia has different sign compared to 
Indonesia case.  
Next, the most important indicator of 
preventing financial distress in Indonesia and 
Malaysia are RE with weight of 0.562 and 0.617 
respectively. However, both EBIT and RE in 
Indonesia and Malaysia are the strongest compared 
to its FE weight. This mean that those two indicators 
of EBIT and RE are important in forming its latent 
variable. As both countries have significantly lower 
value of FE, it indicates that this indicator is not as 
important in forming the variable. Further, weight of 
EBIT and RE in Indonesia are 0.549 and 0.562 
respectively whereas the weight of EBIT and RE in 
Malaysia are 0.611 and 0.617 respectively. Both 
weight of EBIT and RE in Indonesia and Malaysia 
do not show big difference. 
 
Hypothesis Test 
In measuring total effect, the direct effect is 
taken into consideration. The total effect of board 
structure (BS) to the ability in preventing financial 
distress (PFD) in Indonesia is significantly higher at 
6.6049% whereas in Malaysia it is very low at only 
0.2116%. The relationship between BS and PFD in 
Indonesia represents the strongest effect compared 
to relationship of other latent variables with PFD. In 
addition, the effect of BS to PFD in Indonesia is 
significant at α=5% while the relationship of BS to 
PFD is not significant in Malaysia as the p value is 
more than significant level of α=5% and α=10%. 
On the other hand, the total effect result of 
managerial ownership (MO) to the ability in 
preventing financial distress (PFD) is in contrast 
with the total effect result of board structure (BS) to 
ability in preventing financial distress (PFD). The 
total effect between MO and PFD in Malaysia has 
the highest effect compared to the relationship of 
other latent variables with PFD. On the contrary, the 
total effect value between MO and PFD in Indonesia 
has a smallest effect at only 0.2704%. Moreover, the 
relationship between MO and PFD in Indonesia is 
not significant as the p value is more than the 
significant level of α=5% and α=10%. In case of 
Malaysia, the relationship of MO and PFD is 
significant at α=5%.  
Next is the total effect of gender diversity 
(GD) to the ability in preventing financial distress 
(PFD). The relationship between GD and PFD in 
both Indonesia and Malaysia cases represent the 
second strongest effect among other latent variables. 
Total effect results of GD to PFD in Indonesia and 
Malaysia are 2.5921% and 3.24% respectively. 
Further, the relationship of GD and PFD in both 
countries have significant effect as the p value is less 
than significant level of α=5%. 
Lastly, the total effect of gender diversity 
(GD) as a moderating variable in Indonesia is 
2.0736% whereas in Malaysia it is only at 0.3721%. 
The total effect of GD as moderating variable in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia represent the third strongest 
effect among other latent variables. Eventhough it is 
similar as third strongest effect, the total effect value 
of Malaysia is much lower compared to the value of 
Indonesia. Similar to the relationship of GD to PFD, 
the effect of GD as moderating variable to the 
relationship of BS to PFD in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia sample are significant, however it is at 
significant level of α=10%. 
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Analysis 
 
Figure 3. Model Result – Indonesia 
Figure 3. above shows the result of Indonesia 
consumer goods listed companies’ direct effect of 
board structure, managerial ownership and gender 
diversity to the ability of preventing financial 
distress with gender diversity as moderating variable 
after the SEM analysis was completed. The figure 
above presents the results of path coefficients, p 
values and R-squared coefficients. Generally, beta 
coefficient is the value of the path coefficients in 
PLS-based SEM analysis. Meanwhile, the 
percentage of variance in the latent variable which is 
explained by latent variables that are hypothesized 
to affect it is reflected in R-squared coefficient. 
Board structure (BS) has positive impact (p < 
0.05) to the ability in preventing financial distress 
(PFD) with coefficient value of 0.26. On the other 
hand, managerial ownership (MO) has no significant 
impact (p > 0.05 as well as p > 0.10) to the ability in 
preventing financial distress (PFD) as its p value = 
0.28 with coefficient value of 0.05. Meanwhile, 
gender diversity (GD) has positive significant 
impact (p < 0.05) to the ability in preventing 
financial distress (PFD). Gender diversity has 
significant level of < 5% with coefficient value of 
0.26. In addition, gender diversity also serves as 
moderating variable because there is a significant 
impact where its significant level is less than 5% (p 
< 0.05). The coefficient value of gender diversity as 
moderating variable is 0.14. Further, it can be 
concluded that the type of moderation in Indonesia 
sample is quasi moderation based on table 3.3. Quasi 
moderation occurs when b1, b2 and b3 are significant. 
The board structure’s result in Indonesia is in 
accordance with Manzaneque, Priego, & Merino 
(2016) who found that board size and board 
composition is negatively associated with financial 
distress. For board size, previous research study by 
Brédart (2014) has also found that board size has 
negative relationship to financial distress. Hence, 
higher board size will reduce the likelihood of 
company experiencing financial distress. Findings 
in research of Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma (1985) 
shows that non – failed companies tend to have 
larger board compared to failed companies. This 
result also in line with Akhmetova & Batomunkueva 
(2014), Elloumi & Gueyié (2001) and Wang & Deng 
(2006) who found that proportion of independence 
directors on board is negatively related to the 
probability of financial distress. 
For managerial ownership, it is in line with 
empirical result of Li, Wang, & Deng (2008) and 
Wang & Deng (2006) which indicate that 
managerial ownership has insignificant effect to the 
financial distress. This result can be due to small 
fraction of managerial ownership for both board of 
directors and board of commissioners in Indonesia 
(Table 2. shows the mean of managerial ownership 
at 0.02 for board of directors and 0 for board of 
commissioners), thus the effect of convergence or 
entrenchment are limited (Li, et al., 2008). This is 
also possible because the shares own by company’s 
management are belong to employee shares which 
are issued with the aim to add benefits rather than an 
incentive scheme (Xu & Wang, 2007 as cited in 
Wang & Deng, 2006). 
Figure 4. below shows the result of Malaysia 
consumer goods listed companies’ direct effect of 
board structure, managerial ownership and gender 
diversity to the ability of preventing financial 
distress with gender diversity as moderating 
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variable. Board structure has no significant impact 
(p > 0.05 as well as p > 0.10) to the ability in 
preventing financial distress. On the other hand, 
managerial ownership has negative significant 
impact (p < 0.05) to the ability in preventing 
financial distress with coefficient value of 0.28. 
Contrary to managerial ownership, gender diversity 
has positive significant impact (p < 0.05) to the 
ability in preventing financial distress with 
coefficient value of 0.18. Furthermore, gender 
diversity also serves as moderating variables as its 
significant level is less than 10% (p < 0.10) with the 
coefficient value of 0.06. In addition, it can be 
concluded that the type of moderation in Indonesia 
sample is absolute moderation where b1 is not 
significant while b2 and b3 are significant as it is 
shown in table 3.3. 
 
Figure 4. Model Result – Malaysia. 
The board structure’s result is in line with 
Shahwan (2015) who found that there is no 
relationship between corporate governance which is 
measured by corporate governance index to the 
probability in financial distress in Egypt. 
Additionally, previous research studies conducted 
by Akhmetova & Batomunkueva (2014) and Wang 
& Deng (2006) have found that there is no 
significant effect between board size to the 
probability of financial distress. Brédart (2014) and 
Wardhani (2007) also found that board 
independence has insignificant effect to the financial 
distress. Furthermore, Malaysia’s result is in 
accordance with stewardship theory. According to 
stewardship theory, managers are seen as good 
stewards who eagerly do the job to achieve the high 
level of profit and shareholder return (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). Close monitoring and monitoring are 
less likely to be the focused to the manager’s 
stewardship attitude (Davis, et al., 1997). Aside 
from that, the trade statistic in term of export of 
goods and services (% of GDP) in Malaysia for the 
period of 2011 to 2015 is significantly higher 
compared to Indonesia (The World Bank, 2015). In 
2015, the export of goods and services in Malaysia 
shows the percentage 70.9% of GDP (Global Edge, 
2017) meanwhile Indonesia’s export of goods and 
services is only 21.09% of GDP (Global Edge, 
2017). It means that the international trade of 
Malaysia is greater as the percentage of export in 
Malaysia is high. Therefore, companies will try to 
maintain their reputation due to their market has 
expanded to international market. Hence it can be 
inferred that board structure is not related to the 
ability in preventing financial distress because 
corporate governance has become a culture in 
Malaysia companies. 
For managerial ownership, this result 
contradicts with the results of some researchers, 
such as Manzaneque, Priego, & Merino (2016) and 
Akhmetova & Batomunkueva (2014) The negative 
impact in Malaysia sample is occurred due to some 
reasons. First, there are 66% sample which are 
below the mean value of managerial ownership at 
15.88% while the percentage of sample above the 
average is 34%. It represents that most companies in 
the data sample do not have high managerial 
ownership. Second, the average of EBIT as well as 
average of RE in high managerial ownership sample 
are lower compared to low managerial ownership 
sample. The lower average of EBIT indicates that 
the increase in profit is low while lower average of 
RE means that the increased of past profitability is 
also low. Moreover, the average of FE is also lower 
in high managerial ownership which means that the 
cost of debt is low. In other words, companies with 
high managerial ownership in Malaysia data sample 
are less risky rather than companies with low 
managerial ownership. This result can also 
supported by Hofstede Cultural dimension which 
states that Malaysia is more short-term oriented 
(Hofstede, 2017). Besides that, the conflict of 
interest between management, shareholders, 
investors and debt holders are more serious and 
intense in financial distress situation compared to 
normal condition (Donker, et al., 2009). Managers 
choose a short term strategy and make prejudiced 
managerial decisions due to the prospect of losing 
their jobs (Donker, et al., 2009). This lead to 
managers’ behavior to prioritize their personal gains 
and interests rather than making value enhancing 
decisions and maximizing value of company to 
ensure the company’s survival in financial distress. 
 
 Below Mean – 
Low Managerial 
Ownership 
(66% of total 
sample) 
Above Mean – 
High 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(34% of total 
sample) 
Avg. EBIT 97,796,290.34 16,244,582.21 
Avg. FE 8,704,051.94 1,899,701.42 
Average 
RE 
533,658,842.37 68,316,595.98 
Avg. Total 
Assetst-1 
1,070,592,639.70 218,631,252.87 
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Avg. Total 
Debt 
213,712,114.74 40,950,466.40 
Avg.Total 
Equity 
782,753,130.65 151,780,906.05 
Debt/Equit
y 
21% 21% 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 7. Supporting Details for Managerial 
Ownership in Malaysia Sample 
For both Indonesia and Malaysia, gender 
diversity’s results are in accordance with the 
research conducted by Kristanti, Rahayu & Huda 
(2016) who found that gender diversity has an 
impact to financial distress. According to agency 
theory, board diversity can enhance the 
independence on board, thus agency problem in the 
company can be reduced. Furthermore, gender 
diversity on board becomes important as it can add 
value in the companies. Monitoring control in the 
company will also be improved when the board 
consists of men and women (Adams & Ferreira, 
2004). Moreover, Carter, Simskins and Simpson 
(2003) report that there is a positive relationship 
between women presence on board and company’s 
performance. Greater diversity also can provide 
greater innovation, perceptions and flexibility in the 
decision-making process 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The conclusion of hypothesis results in this 
research study are as shown below. 
1. Board structure has a positive impact to the 
ability in preventing financial distress in 
Indonesia, thus the probability of company 
experiencing financial distress is lower. 
Meanwhile, there is no impact found in case of 
Malaysia. 
2. In Indonesia, there is no impact found between 
managerial ownership and ability in preventing 
financial distress. On contrary, managerial 
ownership has a negative impact to the ability in 
preventing financial distress in case of Malaysia 
companies.  
3. Both results of Indonesia and Malaysia shows 
that gender diversity has positive impact to the 
ability in preventing financial distress, thus the 
probability of company experiencing financial 
distress is lower.  
4. Gender diversity as moderating variable in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia has a positive impact to 
the ability in preventing financial distress. The 
positive impact implies that gender diversity is 
able to strengthen the impact of board structure 
to the ability in preventing financial distress.  
Board structure results show mixed results in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. For companies in 
Indonesia, it was found that board structure has an 
impact to the ability in preventing financial distress. 
Higher board structure will lead to higher ability in 
preventing financial distress. Meanwhile, the 
finding in Malaysia data found that there is no 
significant impact between board structure and 
ability in preventing financial distress. Large board 
size can give companies more knowledge, expertise, 
skills and external links which can be useful in 
financial distress situation, however large board size 
may also be less effective and time – consuming. 
Therefore, companies should find and maintain the 
right balance of board structure whether in terms of 
board size or board composition in order to 
maximize the ability in preventing financial distress. 
The number of members on board can be varied 
depend on company’s necessities and complexity of 
its business. Jensen (1993) explained that the board 
function will be more effective when the number of 
boards in the company is less than 7 (seven) to 8 
(eight) members. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggests 
the maximum number of members on board is from 
8 (eight) to 10 (ten), otherwise it will be less 
effective in terms of expressing ideas and opinions 
in limited time (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
Gender diversity in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia has positive impact to the ability in 
preventing financial distress. Furthermore, gender 
diversity also serves as moderating variable in both 
countries. Aside it indicates that proportion on 
women and men on board are important, it also 
shows that gender diversity can strengthen the 
impact of board structure to the ability in preventing 
financial distress. Hence, companies should 
consider and maintain gender diversity on its board 
as gender diversity has its advantages toward 
company’s performance and ability in preventing 
financial distress. 
Besides that, the company’s management is 
encouraged to enrich their knowledge in corporate 
governance mechanism in order to gain a better 
understanding about the impact of corporate 
governance and ability in preventing financial 
distress. This better understanding can help the 
company to overcome and manage the company’s 
survival in financial distress situation. 
The limitation in this research is the average 
adjusted R-squared of Indonesia and Malaysia 
which are 14.9% and 12.5% respectively. These 
results indicate that the model of this research study 
has a very low explanatory power. In addition, the 
goodness of fit test criteria of GoF in Indonesia and 
Malaysia show a medium range. Hence, more 
corporate governance components or other 
variables, such as control variable can be added in 
the future research. Besides that, this research only 
examines Indonesia and Malaysia companies in 
consumer goods sector, thus all sectors in 
manufacturing industry or all registered companies 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange and Bursa Malaysia 
can be examined as the object for further research 
study to give bigger picture about the impact.
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